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| James Jesus Angleton |
In this contest, scenarios written must choose at least three themes out of eleven. I have chosen the themes “Set between 1970-1989”, “Conflict between mythos monsters, DG in the middle”, and “Hook does not involve a murder or a dead body”.
The scenario hook should definitely not involve a murder/dead body because I strongly feel that the community should have more DG games without a starting corpse. This was one of my heavy critiques with Call of Cthulhu adventures when I was playing in the 1990s. You couldn’t turn around in Call of Cthulhu without running into a corpse as the inciting incident. Also, there are plenty of good fanmade DG adventures that do not start with a corpse, and I wanted to join those ranks. So here we go.
“Set between 1970-1989” was an interesting theme since I really did not know details about the actions of the intelligence agencies at that time, and this intrigued me. Naturally, I turned to primary sources for research. Since the historical research community is all abuzz about declassification of JFK assassination files (originally, I was thinking of having the mother of all conspiracy theories have something to do with historical Delta Green activities, but I abandoned that idea), I stumbled into a mostly declassified secret Senate testimony of the CIA counterintelligence head, James Jesus Angleton, that was held in 1975.
It is 152 scanned pages and I have only breeched the first 40 or so of the testimony. It is a fascinating look at how the CIA, FBI, NSA and other organizations were acting in the early 1970s, before that date, and the troubles they were having.
The Church Committee
I will just talk about three programs mentioned. MKULTRA was a CIA program to attempt to develop and refine protocols and drugs that could be used to force confessions through brainwashing and psychological torture. Famously, LSD was used in this program.
Family Jewels was a group of reports on CIA programs. Among these programs discussed were funding of behavior modification research on unwitting U.S. citizens, and assassination plots against Fidel Castro and various other foreign targets, all said to be failures.
Project SHAMROCK revealed the concrete existence of the NSA to the American public, and described its inception through an Armed Forces Security Agency (precursor to the NSA) espionage project to obtain all telegraphic information that entered the US called Project MINARET (1945).
There is a lot here. Needless to say, in 1975 one could gently suggest that the intelligence services were on fire about what was being revealed. However, I am more interested in the early turn of the decade. After all, in 1969 the US had the Apollo 11 moon landing, Woodstock, and the Manson Family murders.
So what state are the intelligence agencies in, during 1970? Enter the James Jesus Angleton secret Senate testimony from 1975. It is record number 157-10014-10004 from the National Archives.
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| Angleton (right) |
Testimony of James Jesus Angleton to the Senate (1975)
Without further ado, here are excerpts from the testimony and my commentary. Brackets contain my inserts. Bolding is also mine.
Page 6
“Mr. Johnson: As the leading counter intelligence expert in the CIA, did you have any concrete evidence yourself that there was a foreign connection to this domestic unrest [Summer 1970]?
Mr. Angleton: The way I would comment on that is simply that the intelligence that we had gathered, fundamentally from December '61 on through, that the counter intelligence effort in the government was very important.”
Fucking amazing. Way to dodge a question and double down that your job is important.
Page 13
“Mr. Johnson: In the summer of 1970 it seems to me, then, the country and the intelligence community faced these facts of life: pronounced domestic unrest; inability to completely understand the degree of foreign connections over domestic unrest; and a severing of relationships between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community.
Mr. Angleton: With the exception of the White House.
Mr. Johnson: With the exception of the White House.”
This establishes the milieu that the US intelligence agencies were finding themselves in during 1970. Almost sounds like a house of cards collapsed.
Page 20
“Mr. Johnson: Is it true that Mr. Hoover underwent a kind of transportation in his attitudes toward what intelligence collection methods were feasible and acceptable in this country, and that he refused to conduct certain activities that he had conducted in the forties and fifties?
Mr. Angleton: Well, during the Johnson Administration and my facts by way of time may not be accurate -- he was being attacked in the Congress over many operational techniques. It is my understanding that he looked to the White House for some relief or approbation, and he received none. I think his attitude was that if he was not going to have the support of the Executive, he was not going to subject the Bureau to a losing battle with politicians. Therefore he began systematically to cut back on all activities.”
Page 21-22
“Mr. Johnson: So the upshot was for Mr. Hoover to eliminate certain collection methods he had used before?
Mr. Angleton: Gradually eliminate them.
Mr. Johnson: Now, what impact did this elimination of previous collection techniques have upon the CIA from your perspective?
Mr. Angleton: I think the basic thing was that it gradually closed sources of information and quality of information. And more important, -- and I think this is axiomatic -- that counter intelligence is about only as good as the relations between the FBI and the CIA are.
In other words, any activities we took up with the Bureau the Bureau always had constructive operational judgment to make. And I think by the same token we had a lot to say on the matter. As your data base disappeared, then your whole perceptions became cloudy, you didn't have the information. And you could not levy on the Bureau as we had prior to this requirement, targets, and other matters where we had coverage abroad. And this interplay between the external and internal is the heart of the operational task.
In other words, to us, if the Bureau is operating one part of the spectrum and we are operating the other, then we would have total coverage. But when you don't have this kind of relationship, and they can't follow up, and they are thwarted from doing many things, I would say the operational value diminishes, and eventually the final blow, banning, doing away with liaison.”
So, when the CIA and FBI had a rift as described at the time, then counterintelligence operations from the CIA just did not have as good information or any information at all.
They were in the dark.
Rife with exploitation for Delta Green scenarios.
P26-P27
“Mr. Johnson: But isn't it true that during this period the military was under severe criticism for earlier civilian surveillance programs?
Mr. Angleton: From where?
Mr. Johnson: I believe the military was preparing for hearings before Sam Ervin's Committee on the subject of military surveillance over civilians. To some degree the military was under public criticism for being in the domestic intelligence gathering field.
Mr. Angleton: But I think the military took the position that they were responsible for their own security in conjunction with all other investigative agencies.
In other words, there has always been a cardinal rule government that the head of every agency is responsible for his own security, that when the FBI develops information on any subversion, within any branch of the government, they send copies of those reports to the heads of the agency concerned for their action.
And, therefore, as far as I know no one had turned over the military prerogatives.
Mr. Johnson: Do these prerogatives extend beyond the military base itself?
Mr. Angleton: I don't know. I don't think it has anything to do with what directly affects the security of the armed forces.”
This discusses the Military gathering intelligence on civilians. Was this in the 1970’s specifically or earlier?
P33
“Mr. Johnson: That just outlines for the NSA its mandate in monitoring the communications facilities, international communications facilities, used by American citizens. You might want to briefly glance over this section which explains it.
[There is a white section here. Is it a redacted section?]
Communications intelligence is an activity of the NSA, as I understand it. And from reading the text it seems like NSA had primary interest here. But I wonder if the CIA was also interested in relaxing restraints in this area.
Mr. Angleton: Every participant is a consumer of NSA product. And therefore they all have a an equal interest, they all had a departmental interest in enhancing the coverage by NSA.”
Discussion of the NSA and it’s “product” (intelligence) by Angleton.
P34
“Mr. Angleton. Normally [when gathering foreign intelligence] all customers [intelligence services], to my knowledge; would levy requirements on NSA.
Mr. Johnson. In the case of the CIA, what would be an example of a name that might be sent to the NSA to be placed on a watch list? You say a terrorist.
Would that be an example?
Mr. Angleton: A terrorist, an organization, intelligence individuals, political individuals, travel control.
Mr. Johnson: Would any of these names include the names of American citizens?
Mr. Angleton: As of that time I don't know. …”
Sure, Mr Angleton. Sure
Discussion of the Angleton testimony and the Delta Green angle on all of this will be included in Part 2.
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